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Para evaluar el efecto de los costos laborales sobre el empleo es crucial tener 
estimaciones confiables de la elasticidad costo laboral de la demanda de trabajo. Usándose 
una base de datos emparejados a nivel de firmas y trabajador, estimamos una función de 
demanda no condicionada de trabajo de largo plazo, explotando información sobre 
trabajadores para corregir la endogeneidad en la determinación de los salarios. Evaluamos los 
efectos sobre el empleo y la pérdida de eficiencia social de los valores observados de las 
aportaciones de los empleadores impuestas por la legislación laboral (seguro de salud, 
capacitación e impuestos) así como de las deducciones a los trabajadores (seguridad social e 
impuesto a la renta). Encontramos que los costos laborales no salariales reducen el empleo en 
17% para los empleados y en 53% para los obreros, con pérdidas de eficiencia social 
asociadas de  10% y 35% del total de la recaudación, respectivamente. Desde que muchas 
firmas subcumplen con las aportaciones y descuentos legales, encontramos que el 
cumplimiento de la ley implicaría una pérdida de 4% de empleo en el caso de los empleados 






To assess the employment effects of labor costs it is crucial to have reliable estimates 
of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm-worker dataset, we 
estimate a long run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers 
to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and 
deadweight loss effects of observed employers’ contributions imposed by labor laws (health 
insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers’ deductions (social security 
and income tax). We find that non-wage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white-
collars and by 53% for blue-collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of 
total contributions, respectively. Since most firms undercomply with mandated employers’ 
and workers contributions, we find that full compliance would imply employment losses of 
4% for white-collars and 12% for blue-collars, with respective associated deadweight losses 
of 2% and 6%.   3
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Non-wage labor costs consist of several mandated benefits, health, training, accident, 
housing plans, as well as several taxes, and are intended to increase workers’ welfare and job 
security. However, these benefits tend to come at the expense of reducing employment and 
deadweight losses. In order to quantify these resulting effects one needs a reliable measure of 
the employment-labor cost elasticity. Most studies conducted on this subject find low 
estimated values for this elasticity, which contrasts with policy-makers’ enthusiasm to reduce 
labor costs. 
 
In this article, using a Peruvian matched firm-workers dataset, we find that non-wage 
labor costs reduce employment measured in total hours of work by 17% for white-collars and 
by 53% for blue-collars with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total 
contributions’ revenues, respectively. We also compute employment losses of compliance 
with mandated employers’ and workers contributions of 4% for white-collars and 12% for 
blue-collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6% of contribution 
revenues. 
 
These results come from estimating the long run unconditional firm-level labor 
demand function by a procedure that corrects for endogeneity of wages. We show that 
unbiased estimates, even using small units such as firm level data, require not only that 
wages are exogenous, but also that their unobserved determinants are uncorrelated with the 
unobserved determinants of labor demand. This requirement is not fulfilled in the likely 
                                                 
*   Our emails: gaguila@pucp.edu.pe, srendon@itam.mx. We thank Cecilia Garavito, Daniel 
Hamermesh, Miguel Jaramillo and participants of the LACEA-LAMES Meetings in 
Mexico, the Second Meetings of Labor Economics in Lima, and seminars at the 
Universidad Católica of Perú and ITAM, for their comments and suggestions. We also 
thank Ramón Díaz for outstanding research assistance. Financial support of the 
Universidad Católica of Perú and of the Asociación Mexicana de Cultura is gratefully 
acknowledged. All errors and omission are only ours.   4
event that larger firms are matched with more productive workers. Consequently, an 
estimation that corrects for endogeneity yields a larger labor cost elasticity of labor demand 
than one that does not, like OLS. 
 
In the last two decades, there has been intensive theoretical and empirical research on 
the effects of labor market frictions on job creation. Western European economies, 
characterized by large job security provisions, have been the center of attention of this 
research that has modeled these frictions as adjustment costs in labor demand (Nickell 1987, 
Hamermesh 1989, Bentolila and Bertola 1990, Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993, Rendon 
2000). This literature finds that the effects of ‘eurosclerosis,’ that is, labor markets with high 
firing costs, are ambiguous: in good times, sclerotic labor markets create fewer jobs than free 
labor markets; however, in bad times, sclerotic labor markets reduce job destruction. Most of 
the research done in Latin America has been done under these guidelines, obtaining 
statistically significant negative effects of job security provisions on employment rates.
1 
Furthermore, using country-level data for Latin America and OECD countries Heckman and 
Pagés-Serra (2000) found large effects of job security provisions on employment,
2 which are 
robust to several specifications,  OLS, random and fixed effects. The authors present their 
results as a strong evidence against Freeman’s (2000) view that job security regulations 
mostly affect distribution, but not efficiency, and “advocate the substitution of job security 
provisions by other mechanisms that provide income security at lower efficiency and 
inequality costs.” Under a classic labor demand framework and using workers- and firm-
level data, this article provides new evidence in the same direction, extending the 
computation of the effects of job security provisions to deadweight losses.  
 
Hamermesh (1993) surveys several studies on the estimation of labor demand and 
remarks that estimates of the labor-cost employment elasticity should be interpreted and 
compared cautiously depending on the specification adopted: whether capital is included as 
an explanatory variable in the estimation (if so one is estimating a short run labor demand; if 
                                                 
1   As referred by Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2000, Table 2 and footnote 6), many of the 
research projects that provide this empirical evidence (for instance Márquez and Pagés-
Serra 1998 or Saavedra and Torero 2000) were evaluations of the labor reforms that 
reduced non-wage labor costs Latin America and sponsored by a Inter-American Bank’s 
research network coordinated by Heckman and Pagés-Serra. 
2   In particular, for Peru, where our data come from, research done so far on the demand for 
labor finds very low labor costs elasticities of labor demand:  [] 65 . 0 , 10 . 0 , ∈ − w L η  
(Rendón and Barreto 1992, IPE 1998, Chacaltana 1999, MTPE 1999, 2004, Jaramillo 
2004).    5
not, it is a long run labor demand); whether output is included in the estimation (if it is, one is 
estimating a conditional labor demand; if not, an unconditional labor demand); whether one 
is estimating a system of equation and thus controlling for endogeneity of wages (in which 
case one will typically find larger estimates). In our study we assume homogeneous labor and 
make two separate estimations for white- and blue-collar workers without allowing for 
interactions between them. Since our study is done for small units, at the firm level, it is a 
reasonable assumption that firms face a horizontal labor supply. However, assortative 
matching between firms and workers gives rise to correlation between wages and firm size, 
which calls for a correction of this endogeneity. Capital is not included in the estimation, nor 
output, which makes the estimation a long run, non-conditional labor demand estimation, that 
is, the scale effect is included in the total effect captured by our estimated elasticity. These 
features of our research explain why we find larger labor costs elasticities of employment
3 
estimates usually found for the standard specification of a conditional labor demand.
4 Our 
results are thus encouraging of policies for stimulating job creation by inducing movements 
along as well as shifts of the labor demand curve. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section details our 
estimation approach which addresses the issue of endogeneity correction; Section 3 describes 
the dataset used, as well as descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the resulting estimated 
labor-cost employment elasticities obtained by OLS and by an IV estimation, both for legal 
and for observed non-wage labor costs. In Section 5 we compute the employment reduction 
caused by workers’ and employers’ contributions. Section 6 reports the calculated 
deadweight losses of workers’ and employers’ contributions as a proportion of contribution 
revenues. Section 7 reports the employment and deadweight losses of complying fully with 
legal workers’ and employers’ contributions. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the article’s 
main conclusions. 
                                                 
3   Another important source of underestimating the labor cost elasticity of employment is the 
presence of measurement error combined with the assumption of homogeneity of labor 
(Clark and Freeman 1980, Roberts and Skoufias1997). 
4   Unlike most studies, however, we use observed rather than legal non-wage labor costs and 
avoid thereby an overestimation of the labor-cost employment elasticity.   6
2. ESTIMATION  APPROACH 
 
Consider a static setup where a firm  { } N i ,..., 2 , 1 ∈ chooses inputs to maximize 
profits:  { } i
a
i i i i i i i L K L w K r L K f p − − Ω ) | , ( max , . The resulting demand for labor is given by 




i i X w L L =  where wi
a is the total labor cost paid by the firm and 
{} i i i i r p X Ω = , ,
*  represents output and input prices and the parameters of the production 
function for the firm. A log-linear approximation to this function is  
 
                                                      i i
a
i i u X w L + + = δ β ln ln                                           (1) 
 
where Xi are those variables contained in Xi
* that are observed by the researcher, whereas ui is 
a random variable representing the unobserved components of Xi
* , assumed to be normal 
with zero mean and variance σu
2.  
 
If wages are fully exogenous, that is, if 
a
i w ln  is uncorrelated with  i u , then one can 
obtain an unbiased and consistent estimation of β by OLS. For this assumption to hold, 
wages have to be determined by an infinitely elastic labor supply. Actually, most empirical 
research, assumes exogenous wages and estimates the elasticity labor- labor cost by OLS. 
This includes those estimations that account for individual (fixed) effects when panel data are 
available. 
 
To illustrate this assertion, let the infinitely elastic labor supply of individual  j ∈ {1, 
2, 3,...Mi} related to firm i be 
 
                                                   ij ij
d
ij Z w υ γ + = ln                                                       (2) 
 
where  wij
d is the take-home wage,  Zij is a vector of covariates that determine wages, γ are its 
associated parameters, and υij is a random variable of unobservables with zero mean, 
variance  συ
2 and covariance with  ui equal to  σuυ. This is a reduced form equation that can 
be though of as a Mincer equation in which Zij only include supply-side variables, such as 
education,
5 tenure, experience, and individual workers’ attributes.
6 Then firm i faces a labor 
supply function: 
                                                 
5   Unfortunately, our dataset does not include any variable that could possible proxy workers’ 
education.   7
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i Z w υ γ + = ln                                                            (3) 
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1 1 1 , , ln ln    and     is distributed with 




i M , and covariance with ui equal to  σuυ . Assume for the moment that 
wages paid by employers coincide with workers’ take-home wages:  wi
d = wi
a,  then, as this is 
a recursive or limited information estimation model, OLS estimates yield unbiased estimates 
of the labor demand parameters. The crucial assumption for this to be true is that the firm’s 
individual labor supply is infinitely elastic and error terms are independent, σuυ = 0. 
 
However, it may well be the case that   0 ≠ υ σ u  which implies that  wi
a  and ui are 
correlated and the estimation by OLS generates biased estimates. Moreover, if σuυ > 0, that 
is, if unobservables that increase wages are positively correlated with unobservables that 
increase labor demand, then β estimated by OLS will exhibit an upward bias. One can think 
of this positive correlation as evidence for positive assortative matching between firms and 
workers: more productive workers are matched to larger firms. Or, in terms of the variables 
that are unobserved to the researcher, workers’ of higher ability may work in firms of higher 
total factor productivity. On the contrary, σuυ  < 0 is associated with unobservables that 
increase wages negatively correlated with unobservables that increase labor demand, in 
which case OLS leads to underestimate β. Therefore, that is the case of negative assortative 
matching between firms and workers: more productive workers are matched to smaller 
firms.
7 
                                                                                                                                                 
6   If Zij Eq. (2) includes labor demand variables that are excluded in Eq. (1), then it becomes 
a typical reduced form and one can attempt to identify not only the labor demand labor cost 
elasticity, but also the labor supply labor cost elasticity. We leave this extension for future 
research. 
7   Or, when employment is measured by individual hours of work, it is likely to find negative 
matching: more productive workers are matched to firms with fewer individual hours of 
work, as shown in Section 4.   8














Figure 1 depicts the supply and demand for labor and illustrates this matching effect: 
if D1 is matched to S1, D2 to S2, and D3 to S3, then the resulting equilibrium points describe a 
positive relationship or a negative relationship that is steeper than the labor demand 
(overestimation of β); if matching between supply and demand is the other way round, 
negative, the relationship resulting from the equilibrium points is flatter than the labor 
demand (underestimation of β). 
 
Now, let us allow labor costs paid for by employers differ from workers’ take-home 
wages. Suppose that employers’ contributions expressed as a percentage of wages are ai, so 
that employers’ labor costs are  wi
a  =  wi(1+ai). On the other hand, let di be workers’ 
contributions as a percentage of wages, and workers’ take home wage is then  wi
d = wi(1-di).  
Under the assumption that both employer- and worker-paid contributions are unrrelated to 
unobservables that determine firm’s size
8 one can relate employers’ labor costs to workers’ 
earnings simply by  
 




i a d w w + + − − =                                  (4) 
 
                                                 
8    In this article, we take under compliance as given and only analyze its effects on 
employment and measurement of the labor-cost elasticity; however, strictly speaking under 
complying is also a decision made by employers, which therefore would require a specific 
theoretical and empirical analysis. 
   9
Notice that if wages are fully exogenous,
9 under no circumstance workers earn below 
ln  wi
d, which implies that workers’ contributions are actually paid for by employers. In 
particular, if workers’ contributions were reduced, employer-paid wages would adjust so that 
workers’ take-home wages are left unchanged. This feature of the labor market will be 
important when analyzing the employment effects of removing workers’ and employers’ 
contributions. 
 
Under this setup we can propose the following estimation procedure: 
 
1.  First Stage: Estimate Eq. (2), predict the workers’ take-home wage, aggregate
10 them 








i w  
from Eq. (4) 




i w . 
 
This estimation procedure removes the correlation between labor costs paid for by 
employers and the disturbance term in Eq. (1) and yields unbiased estimates of β and δ. 
 
To implement this estimation we need firm-level data matched with data on 
individuals working at the firm. In the next section, we describe the data used in the 
estimation. 
 
3.  DATA 
 
The data used in this estimation come from the Wage and Salary National Survey 
(ENSYS) carried out by the Ministry of Labor of Peru. This is a biquarterly survey applied in 
June and December, which comprises private firms of 10 and more workers and is 
representative for the main cities (Metropolitan Lima and urban areas of 24 main cities in the 
country), economic sectors and activities, and firms sizes in Peru. The information for this 
                                                 
9   This is an important identification assumption, the labor supply is horizontal to the market, 
which makes feasible the determination of the labor cost elasticity of the labor demand. 
This assumption does not hold if the labor supply is horizontal to the firm, but not to the 
market, as aggregation does not preserve the horizontal labor supply. 
10   When employment is measured by individual hours of work and, consequently, one is 
estimating an individual labor demand, there is no need to perform this aggregation.   10
survey is gathered by qualified interviewers from the Labor Ministry who review firms’ 
payrolls and are specialized in labor costs in Peru; thus, this survey does not consist of self-
reported data. 
 
The survey is organized in three sections. Section A aggregate firm-level information 
such as the total number of workers, wages by occupational category, total hours worked, 
legal workers’ deductions and employers’ contributions by occupational category. Section B 
contains information on a sample of individual workers inside the firm, with variables such 
as age and gender of the worker, hours worked, basic wage or salary, legal workers’ 
deductions and employers’ contributions, and other nonpermanent payments. Finally, Section 
C provides information on collective bargaining and unionization of workers. 
 
We use the survey for June 2004, which consists of a sample of 1,772 firms, for 
which we have 19,770 workers. Because we concentrate on the demand for white- and blue-
collar workers, we select two subsamples of firms that hire at least one of these two types of 
workers. Thus, the resulting samples contain respectively 1,714 firms with 13,097 white-
collar workers, and 692 firms with 5,413 blue-collar workers.   11
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for White- and Blue-collar workers Firm and Worker 
Samples. Standard errors in small fonts 
 
White-collar Blue-collar 
Workers Survey´s Section  Firm Worker Firm  Worker 
Hours of work  44.5  46.1  42.9  45.8 
 6.4  7.5  7.7  9.6 
Employment 99.80    128.4   
 300.9    297.5   
Wages 542.2  605.0  232.9  246.2 
 477.0  668.5  188.3  386.1 
Employers´contributios (% of wage)         
Observed 10.2  10.3  10.7  10.9 
 1.4  1.4  3.6  4.8 
Legal 14.5  14.5  14.5  14.5 
  0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
Workers´s contributions   (% of wage)          
Observed 15.7  14.9  11.99  11.8 
   4.8  5.5  2.3  2.7 
Legal 17.8  18.0  13.1  13.3 
 6.0  6.5  3.2  3.6 
Economic Sector         
Primary 6.4  4.8  10.3  13.7 
Industry 23.4  18.7  48.3  56.5 
Services 70.2  76.6  41.5  29.9 
Firm size         
≤50 62.2  30.9  50.9  19.7 
51-99 13.1  19.2  13.4  13.4 
≥100 24.7  49.9  35.7  66.9 
Lima Met  48.6  55.6  42.8  46.9 
Union 8.2  13.6  15.0  20.0 
Women   37.4    14.0 
Age   37.8    37.4 
   10.2    11.1 
 ≤24   4.1    8.4 
25 -45     72.3    66.7 
 >45    23.7    25.0 
Tenure   6.1    6.0 
   7.4    8.1 
<3   46.9    53.6 
3 - 8     29.2    22.7 
> 8     23.9    23.7 
Nobs. 1714  13097  692  5413   12
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables in the final sample, divided 
by type of worker and by section of the survey. For several variables there are both firm-level 
as well as individual information. Understandably, there is more dispersion for information 
in the workers’ sample (Section B). Both white- and blue-collar workers work on average 
more than 40 hours a week. On average, blue-collar workers work in firms that are 30% 
larger than white-collars and earn half as much as white-collars. 
 
Figure 2: Employers and Workers’ contributions as a percentage of wages 

















In this study, gross wages are defined as payments made by employers to their 
employees for their work that end up in employees’ paychecks, including any mandatory 
benefits,
11 before deductions for income taxes and pension contributions are applied. 
Workers’ contributions are mandatory payments deducted from workers’ paychecks, that is, 
pension contributions and income taxes. Employers’ contribution are payments associated 
with workers’ wages that employers pay and workers do not take home nor are deducted 
from workers’ gross wages, but go to several funds, such as health or training systems, and 
                                                 
11   These definitions are important because many other studies confuse mandatory benefits 
that workers take home, such as vacations’ payments, which here are considered as part of 
wages, with non-wage labor costs paid for by employers. 
   13
payroll taxes.
12 Both observed employers’ and workers’ contributions are on average lower 
than legal ones, i.e., undercompliance is predominant.
13 Observed employers’ contribution 
are between 10% and 11% of wages for all samples, while legal contributions are established 
at 14.5%. For white-collars observed workers’ contributions are between 15% and 16% of 
wages, while the legal contributions are around 18%; for blue-collars observed workers’ 
contributions are around 12% of wages, while legal contributions are set at around 13%. 
Figure 2 shows the employers’ contributions and workers’ deductions as a function of wages, 
both for white- and blue-collar workers. For employers’ contributions one can distinguish a 
dispersion around horizontal lines, because legal contributions are a fixed percentage that 
does not depend on wage levels. However, the dispersion of workers’ deductions occurs 
around both increasing curves and horizontal lines, as some deductions are increasing in 
wages, income taxes, while others are fixed, pensions’ contributions. Moreover, there is 
compliance with some contributions and not with others, which explains why one can 
distinguish several patterns in these graphs, which are illustrative of the important differences 
between legal and observed non-wage labor costs. 
 
In the subsample of white-collars, around 70% of firms and 77% individuals are 
occupied in the service sector; whereas in the subsample of blue-collars around 50% of firms 
and 57% of individuals are classified as part of the industrial sector. For both subsamples 
most firms are small, more than 50% employ 50 workers or less; however, more than 50% of 
workers work in firms with 100 or more workers. Around half of firms are located in Lima 
City, the capital of the country. Unionization is higher for blue-collar workers with rates 
between 15% and 20% of workers, while for white-collars unionization rates are between 8% 
and 14%. 
 
In terms of individual data we find that 38% are females among the white-collars 
while only 14% among the blue-collars. On average both white- and blue-collars are around 
38 years old, however among blue-collars there is more age dispersion especially at the lower 
tail: around 12% of blue-collars, against only 4% of white collars, are 24 years old or 
                                                 
12   Thus employers’ and workers’ contributions are non-wage labor costs. The former displace 
the demand and the latter the supply of labor. Unlike other studies which only focus on 
employers’ non-wage labor costs, both types of non-wage labor costs matter in reducing 
employment. Interestingly, from an economic point of view, as said before, if the labor 
supply is fully elastic, all non-wage labor costs are paid for by employers. 
13   The interested reader will find a brief explanation of the labor reforms in Peru in the 
nineties in Appendix A1 and a detailed description of non-wage labor costs in Appendix 
A2.   14
younger. In the samples both white- and blue-collars have on average around 6 years of 
tenure; however, in tenure it is blue collars who also exhibit more dispersion, especially at 
the lower tails. While 23% of white-collars have around less than one year of tenure, 29% of 
blue-collars have tenure of less than one year. 
 
In the next sections, we present the results of estimating a labor demand model both 
by simple OLS and controlling for the endogeneity of wages. 
 
4.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
In this section, we present the elasticities estimated by the procedure described in 
Section 2. We estimate several versions of the model, the results of which are presented in 
Table 2. For the total hours of work and for the number of workers, we report in the first 
column an OLS estimation using the average wage reported in the firm level information, in 
the second column an OLS estimation using an average wage constructed using the 
individual information, and in the third column an estimation that accounts for endogeneity, 
an OLS estimation using the average of a predicted wage. For individual hours, we report 
OLS and IV results in the first and second columns, respectively.   15
Table 2. Estimated wage-elasticities of demand for labor measured as 
total hours, workers, and individual hours. Standard errors in small fonts 
 
 Total hours  Number of workers  Individual hours 
  m
a w ln  
a
w ln   p
a w ln m
a w ln
a
w ln   p
a w ln i
a w ln   ip
a w ln  
White - collar workers 
Observed 
β  0.1810 0.1659 -0.6451 0.3233 0.2255 -0.4982 -0.0567 -0.0448 
  0.0519 0.0532 0.1882 0.0518 0.0521 0.1949 0.0018 0.0046 
R
2  0.179 0.178 0.179 0.212 0.202 0.196 0.118 0.047 
       
L e g a l           
β  0.1827 0.1683 -0.5198 0.3258 0.2282 -0.3628 -0.0569 -0.0482 
  0.0519 0.0532 0.1882 0.0519 0.0521 0.1911 0.0018 0.0046 
R
2  0.179 0.178 0.177 0.212 0.202 0.194 0.119 0.048 
Nobs. 1714  1714  13097 
Blue-collar workers 
Observed 
β  -0.1300 -0.0555 -2.2821 0.1406 -0.0319 -2.3043 -0.0381 0.0004 
  0.1217 0.1326 0.3880 0.1184 0.1314 0.3806 0.0041 0.0118 
R
2  0.183 0.181 0.230  0.1838  0.182 0.234 0.073 0.063 
          
L e g a l           
β  -0.1322 -0.0553 -2.2682 0.1511 -0.0311 -2.3206 -0.0408 0.0110 
  0.1249 0.1382 0.3984 0.1215 0.1368 0.3911 0.0043 0.0124 
R
2  0.183 0.181 0.227 0.184 0.182 0.232 0.073 0.063 
Nobs. 692  692  5413 
 
m w ln :  Log of the Average Firm-level Wage (Firms’ sample) 
w ln :  Firm-level Average of Log-Wage (Workers’ sample) 
p w ln :  Average Firm-level predicted Log-Wage (Workers’ sample) 
i w ln :  Log of the Individual Wage (Workers’ sample) 
ip w ln :  Log of the Predicted Individual Wage (Workers’ sample). 
 
 
In these regressions, explanatory variables besides labor costs are dummy variables 
indicating location, whether there is a union in the firm, and sector of activity. These 
variables capture differences in capital prices across regions, labor relations across firms, and 
technologies across industrial sectors. Exogenous sources of variation for endogeneity   16
correction are workers’ age, tenure, and gender. Further details on the first stage wage 
regressions, Eqs. (2), and their explanatory variables, are given in Appendix A3. 
 
Both for white- and blue-collars, when employment is firms’ employment measured 
by hours of work or by the number of workers, an estimation that accounts for endogeneity 
yields a larger labor cost elasticity of labor demand than one that is done by simple OLS, 
which suggests the existence of positive assortative matching between firms and workers. 
When employment is measured by individual hours of work, correcting for endogeneity 
reduces the labor cost elasticity of labor demand, implying negative assortative matching of 
workers and firms’ individual hours of work. In sum, more productive workers are matched 
to firms that are larger, in terms of total hours worked and number of employees, and in 
which working time is shorter. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the labor cost elasticity of the firm-level labor demand is 
larger for blue-collar than for white-collar workers: measured by total hours it is -0.65 for 
white-collars and -2.31 for blue-collars; measured by the number of workers it is -0.51 for 
white-collars and -2.31 for blue-collars. In contrast, the individual hours labor demand has an 
elasticity of -0.05 for white-collars and 0.00 for blue-collars. 
 
For white-collar workers there is no big difference in estimating by OLS the total 
labor cost elasticity with the reported or the constructed firm average wage (ln wm and  
_____
lnw). 
The sign, however, in both of these estimations is wrong and only becomes negative once 
endogeneity is corrected for. Using legal rather than observed non-labor costs produces an 
underestimation of the labor cost elasticity of employment as measured by total hours of 
work or number of workers, although this underestimation is lower once a correction for 
endogeneity is introduced. For individual hours of work, using legal rather than observed 
labor costs leads to a slight overestimation of this elasticity, though both yield very low 
values. 
 
For blue-collar workers, estimating the labor cost elasticity by OLS with the reported 
or the constructed firm average wage (ln wm and 
_____
lnw) yields substantially different results. 
Estimating the total labor cost elasticity correcting for endogeneity yields very high values 
for employment measured by total hours and number of workers. The labor cost employment 
elasticity measured by total hours is underestimated when legal instead of observed non-  17
wage labor costs are used; however, it is slightly overestimated when employment is 
measured by the number of workers. The labor cost elasticity of employment measured by 
individual hours has the wrong sign, its value is very small and in many cases non-
significant. As with white-collars, using legal rather than observed labor costs implies a 
slight overestimation of the labor elasticity of demand. 
 
In sum, estimations of the firm-level labor demand that are corrected for endogeneity 
generate large labor costs employment elasticities, especially for blue-collar workers. The 
opposite is true for the corresponding individual labor demand estimations, where corrections 
for endogeneity lower labor cost employment elasticities, especially for blue-collars. 
 
In the next section, we use these estimated elasticities to forecast the employment and 
deadweight loss effects of non-wage labor costs. 
 
5.  EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF NON-WAGE LABOR COSTS 
 
In this section, we predict the percentage employment variation produced by 
removing non-wage labor costs fully, that is, the effects of eliminating 
1.  employer-paid non-labor costs:  
_ __________
) 1 ln( ˆ ln a L + × − = ∆
∧
β      
2.  worker-paid non-labor costs:  
_ __________
) 1 ln( ˆ ln d L − × = ∆
∧
β      
3.  both employer-and worker-paid non-labor costs:  ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − − + × = ∆
∧ _________ _________
) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ˆ -     ln d a L β  
   18
Table 3. Employment eﬀects of removing employers’, workers’, and both contributions. 
Standard errors in small fonts 
 
Total hours  Number of workers  Indiv. hours 
  m
a w ln  
a
w ln   p
a w ln   m
a w ln  
a
w ln   p
a w ln   i
a w ln   ip
a w ln  
White-collar workers 
Employer 
Observed -1.76  -1.62  6.26  -3.14 -2.20 4.86  0.55  0.44 
  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Legal -2.47  -2.27  6.99  -4.40 -3.08 4.90  0.77  0.65 
  0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Worker         
Observed -3.29  -2.72  10.51  -5.87 -3.69 8.16  0.93  0.73 
  0.02 0.02 0.29 0.05 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.00 
Legal -3.85  -3.39  10.42  -6.86 -4.59 7.30  1.15  0.97 
  0.03 0.02 0.24 0.07 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.00 
Employer and Worker 
Observed -5.04  -4.34  16.76  -9.01 -5.89 13.02  1.48  1.17 
  0.02 0.02 0.29 0.05 0.03 0.22 0.00 0.00 
Legal -6.31  -5.66  17.42  -11.26 -7.67 12.19  1.91  1.62 
  0.03 0.02 0.25 0.07 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.00 
Blue-collar workers 
Employer 
Observed 1.33  0.57  23.45  -1.43 0.33 23.68  0.39  0.00 
  0.02 0.02 0.98 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.00 0.00 
Legal 1.78  0.75  30.61  -2.04 0.42 31.32  0.55  -0.15 
  0.03 0.03 0.29 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.00 
Worker         
Observed 1.67  0.70  28.84  -1.80 0.40 29.12  0.48  0.00 
  0.03 0.03 0.81 0.02 0.03 0.82 0.00 0.00 
Legal 1.87  0.80  32.69  -2.14 0.45 33.44  0.59  -0.16 
  0.03 0.04 0.92 0.03 0.04 0.93 0.00 0.00 
Employer and Worker 
Observed 2.99  1.27  52.29  -3.24 0.73 52.80  0.87  -0.01 
  0.03 0.03 1.27 0.03 0.03 1.28 0.00 0.00 
Legal 3.66  1.54  63.30  -4.18 0.87 64.76  1.14  -0.31 
  0.13 0.15 2.06 0.12 0.15 2.06 0.00 0.00 
 
m w ln :  Log of the Average Firm-level Wage (Firms’ sample) 
w ln :  Firm-level Average of Log-Wage (Workers’ sample) 
p w ln :  Average Firm-level predicted Log-Wage (Workers’ sample) 
i w ln :  Log of the Individual Wage (Workers’ sample) 
ip w ln :  Log of the Predicted Individual Wage (Workers’ sample).   19
We perform these exercises
14 using both observed and legal non-wage labor costs 
and their associated estimated elasticities computed in the previous section, for the three 
measures of employment by total hours, number of workers, and individual hours. The 
results are reported in Table 3 and show that the largest employment effects are obtained 
from reducing workers’ non-wage labor costs, especially for white-collar workers. For 
white-collar workers removing employer-paid non-wage labor costs increases firm-level 
total hours of work by around 6% and the number of workers by 5%, while removing 
workers’ paid non-wage labor costs increases hours of work by 11% and the number of 
workers by 8%. The elimination of both non-wage labor costs increases total hours by 17% 
and the number of workers by 13%. Thus, employment effects for white-collars are larger for 
total hours than for number of workers. For individual hours effects are small but significant 
and positive: around 1% increase. 
 
For blue-collar workers, employment effects are similar for total hours and for the 
number for workers and much larger than for white-collars: 24% for removing employers’ 
contributions and 29% for removing workers’ contributions, so that the employment effect of 
removing both contributions is 53%. For blue-collar workers individual hours effects are not 
significantly different from zero. 
 
Using legal rather than observed non-wage labor costs introduces an important 
overestimation of the employment effects for blue-collar workers, measured by total hours, 
number of workers, or individual hours. For white-collar workers the differences between 
legal and observed employment effects are less pronounced. There is also an overestimation 
of employment variations when using legal non-wage labor costs for total and individual 
hours, but an underestimation for the number of workers. 
 
Hence, the employment losses provoked by both employers’ and workers’ 
contributions are shown to be substantial, especially for blue-collar workers. Estimations that 
do not correct for endogeneity would have found positive significant employment increases 
for white-collars and negligible increases for blue-collars, concluding thereby that non-wage 
labor costs had very little effect in stimulating employment, as it is the case in most of the 
                                                 
14   Notice that these predicted employment variations assume a constant elasticity of demand, 
that is, they are a linear approximation of the employment effects and are thus less 
accurate, the larger the labor cost variation.   20
literature on this subject. In the next section, we compute the deadweight losses associated 
with these employment effects. 
 
6.  DEADWEIGHT LOSSES OF NON-WAGE LABOR COSTS 
 
In this section we compute the deadweight loss effects of employers’ and workers’ 
contributions. We estimated the model  i
a
i i A w L + = ∆
∧
ln     ln β , where Ai  =  Xiδ  are the 
employment effects of all other regressors; that is, the level of employment is L = Aw
β. We 
have two wage levels, w1 and w0 (w1 > w0), which imply employment levels L1 = Aw1
β  and 
L0 = Aw0 
β, respectively. Contribution revenues are then R = (w1 − w0) L1 > 0, and the 
deadweight loss area comes from integrating: 
 
R
L w L w






= − =∫ 1






In Appendix 4, we give further details on this computation (See also Auerbach 
and Hines (2002). One can also approximate the deadweight loss, as it is usually done, by 
a (Harberger) triangle: 
 
2





Figure 3 illustrates the deadweight loss area T and the contribution revenues R, when 
there are both employer’s contributions, which shift the labor demand downward, and 
worker’s contribution, which shift the labor supply upward   21

















Then, wage levels w1 and w0 are then defined for 
 
1.  employers’ contributions: w1 = w (1 + a) , w0 = w 
2.  workers’ contributions: w1 = w, w0 = w (1 − d) 
3.  both workers’ and employers’ contributions: w1 = w (1 + a), w0 = w (1 − d) 
 
Table 4 reports the estimated deadweight losses of eliminating workers’ and 
employers’ contributions, using different measures of employment, of contributions, and of 
deadweight losses, for white-collar and for blue-collar workers, respectively. As with 
employment effects deadweight losses are larger for workers’ than for employers’ 
contributions for both occupational categories, and larger for blue-collar than for white-collar 
workers. For white-collars deadweight losses of observed employers’ contributions are 5.6% 
of contribution revenues; of observed workers’ contributions they are 3.2% of contribution 
revenues, when measured by total hours. For blue-collars deadweight losses of observed 
employers’ contributions are 12.5% of contribution revenues; of observed workers’ 
contributions they are 16.1% of contribution revenues, when measured by total hours. For 
blue-collar workers deadweight losses are practically identical when employment is 
   22
measured by the number of workers. For white-collar workers, deadweight losses are 2.5% 
of contribution revenues for employers’ contributions and 4% for workers’ contributions. For 
individual hours effects are very small for white-collar workers and, as employment effects, 
appear with the wrong sign for blue-collar workers. 
 
Table 4: Estimated Deadweight loss of Employer, Worker and both Contributions 
as a Percentage of Contribution Revenues 
 
Total Hours  Number of Workers  Individual Hours  Contribution 
Integral Triangle  Integral  Triangle  Integral  Triangle 
White-collar workers 
Employer 
   Observed  3.14  3.23  2.44  2.50  0.22  0.22 
    Legal  3.50  3.62  2.43  2.51  0.32  0.33 
            
Worker 
   Observed  5.59  5.90  3.88  4.06  0.36  0.37 
    Legal  5.15  5.47  3.41  3.58  0.47  0.49 
            
Employer and Worker 
   Observed  8.77  9.51  6.31  6.76  0.56  0.59 
    Legal  8.64  9.49  5.79  6.27  0.77  0.82 
            
Blue-collar workers 
Employer 
   Observed  12.51  13.35  12.33  13.13  -0.00  -0.00 
    Legal  17.02  18.39  16.59  17.91  -0.01  -0.01 
            
Worker 
   Observed  15.77  17.02  15.85  17.12  -0.00  -0.00 
    Legal  18.26  19.96  18.65  19.19  -0.08  -0.08 
         
Employer and Worker 
   Observed  30.37  34.94  30.25  34.84  -0.00  -0.00 
    Legal  38.55  45.69  37.21  43.96  -0.15  -0.15 
 
 
For white-collar workers deadweight losses, both in terms of total hours and the 
number of workers, are somewhat larger when measured by observed rather than by legal 
non-wage labor costs. For blue-collar workers, they are substantially smaller for the observed 
non-wage labor costs both when using total hours and the number of workers. 
 
Thus, there are not only substantial employment losses but also large deadweight 
losses of mandated employers’ and workers’ contributions, especially for blue-collar 
workers.   23
7.  EMPLOYMENT AND DEADWEIGHT LOSSES OF COMPLYING WITH 
LEGAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
In this section we analyze the employment and deadweight loss effects of adjusting 
observed non-wage labor costs to their legal level. 
 
Table 5: Employment effects of undercomplying 
with legal non-wage labor costs. Standard errors in small fonts 
 
Contribution  Total hours  Number of workers  Individual hours 
White-collar workers 
Employer 2.40  1.86  0.17 
 0.01  0.01  0.00 
Worker 2.40  1.86  0.17 
 0.13  0.08  0.00 
Employer and worker  4.79  3.72  0.33 
 0.13  0.08  0.00 
     
Blue-collar workers 
Employer 7.35  7.42  0.00 
 0.70  0.71  0.00 
Worker 4.05  4.09  0.00 
 0.81  0.82  0.00 
Employer and worker  11.40  11.51  0.00 
 1.07  1.09  0.00 
 
 
What is the employment effect of firms not fully complying with paying employers’ 
and workers’ contributions? Because of under-compliance, the actual labor cost incurred by 
firms is lower than the stipulated legal one. Table 5 reports the effects of not complying with 
legal contributions on employment measured by total hours worked at the firm level, the 
number of workers by firm, and individual hours. For white-collar workers the effect of not 
complying with legal workers’ contributions is about the same as the effect of not complying 
with employers’ contributions, 2.42% for total hours, 1.90% for the number of workers, and 
0.17% for individual hours. The total effect of not complying with these two contributions 
amounts to 4.83% for total hours, 3.81% for the number of workers, and 0.34% of individual 
hours. 
 
For blue-collar worker the picture is somewhat different, as the employment effect of 
not complying with the employers’ contributions is larger than the effect of not complying 
with the workers’ contributions. Moreover, since the labor cost elasticity is large, the 
employment effects are much larger than for white-collar workers. As one would expect   24
because of the low labor costs individual hours elasticities, for blue-collar workers the effect 
in individual hours is negligible. Both for employment measured as total hours of work or 
the number of workers, employment effects of not complying with employers’ contributions 
is around 7.5%, and it is around 4.1%for not complying with workers’ contributions. Thus, 
the effect of not complying with both contributions is around 11.6%. As shown in the 
previous sections, variations in the individual hours margin induced by labor costs variations 
is somewhat important only for white-collar workers, not for blue-collars. 
 
Table 6: Deadweight loss of complying with Employer, Worker and both 
legal contributions as a percentage of contribution Revenues 
 
Total hours  Number of workers  Individual hours  Contribution 
Integral Triangle Integral Triangle Integral Triangle 
White-collar workers 
Employer  1.21 1.24 0.89 0.91 0.08 0.08 
Worker  0.93 0.98 1.16 1.19 0.08 0.08 
Employer  and  Worker  2.13 2.20 2.05 2.11 0.16 0.17 
        
Blue-collar workers 
Employer  4.02 4.20 3.94 4.10 0.00 0.00 
Worker  1.98 2.08 2.22 2.31 0.00 0.00 
Employer  and  Worker  6.01 6.30 6.22 6.50 0.00 0.00 
 
 
In Table 6 we show the deadweight losses resulting from complying fully with the 
legal level of non-wage labor costs.
15 As in the previous section, we compute them both as 
an integral and simply as a triangle. For white collar workers, the deadweight loss of both 
employer’s and worker’s contributions measured as total hours or as the number of workers 
is around 2% of contribution revenues, split almost evenly between the two. For blue collar 
workers, the deadweight loss represents around 6% of contribution revenues, again for both 
contributions and measured as total hours or the number of workers. Once again, individual 
hours of blue collar workers are not reactive to labor costs variations; consequently 
deadweight losses are smaller than for white-collars. 
 
In sum, judging from its implied employment and deadweight losses, 
undercompliance is substantial. Employment losses of compliance with mandated 
                                                 
15   In Appendix A5 we provide some details on the computation of the deadweight losses of 
undercompliance with legal contributions.   25
employers’ and workers contributions are 4% for white-collars and 12% for blue-collars, 




Using a matched firm-workers dataset we have shown that an estimation that 
accounts for endogeneity of wages yields a larger labor cost elasticity of a long run, 
unconditional labor demand than one obtained by OLS. We explain that this result is 
evidence for positive assortative matching between firms and workers: larger firms are 
matched with more productive workers. We find that employer’s and worker’s paid non-
wage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white-collars and by 53% for blue-collars. 
The associated deadweight loss of these non-wage labor costs are 9% of contribution 
revenues for white-collar workers and 31% of contribution revenues for blue-collars. 
Significant increases of individual hours only occur for white-collar, not for blue-collar 
workers, that is, white-collars exhibit a larger labor costs elasticity of demand for individual 
hours than blue-collars. 
 
On the other hand, estimating labor costs employment elasticities using nonwage 
labor costs measured in the available datasets rather using legally established rules yields 
substantially different results only for white-collar workers, for which undercompliance with 
legal contributions is larger than for blue-collars. Furthermore, we compute the employment 
effects of undercomplying with the mandated employers’ and workers contributions. 
Because of undercompliance employment is 4% larger for white-collars and 12% larger for 
blue-collars. The deadweight loss of complying with mandated contribution is 2% for white-
collars and 6% of contribution revenues for blue-collars. 
 
These results show large employment and, often ignored, deadweight losses of both 
mandated employer’s and worker’s contributions and are thus encouraging of policies to 
increase job creation by lowering non-wage labor costs.   26
APPENDIX 
 
A1.  Labor reforms in Peru in the nineties 
 
According to Saavedra (2000), labor laws were very restrictive, protectionist and 
cumbersome. In the early nineties Peru went through a process of ‘structural’ reforms that 
were intended to make labor markets more flexible. 
Blue-collars and White-Collars.- Before the reform there was a strong distinction between 
white- and blue-collar workers, so that firms had to have different payrolls with different 
payment frequencies for these two types of workers: blue-collars were paid on a weekly 
basis, while white-collars on a monthly basis. Blue-collars had more benefits than white-
collars, which reduced the relative hiring of blue-collars. (Chacaltana 1999). The reform 
eliminated the strong distinction between them, so that both are considered workers with 
same severance payments and other benefits. Firms are also free to choose the frequency of 
payment to their workers. 
Firing costs.- Up to the 1990 workers in Peru enjoyed absolute stability at the workplace, a 
right that was protected by the Constitution. The labor reform changed this completely by 
introducing the ‘unfair’ firing, that is, workers can be fired without any justification, just 
receiving a severance payment. In 1996, after several changes, firing costs for unfair 
dismissals were established at one and a half monthly wages for every year employed at the 
firm, with a ceiling of twelve wages. The reform also extended ‘fair’ dismissals to include 
workers’ bad conduct and low productivity, and introduced technological, economic and 
structural reasons as valid causes for collective layoffs, that is, dismissals of no less than 
10% of the workforce. 
Temporary Contracts.- Before the reforms a temporary contracts required written 
authorization by the Ministry of Labor, had a maximum duration of one year and were 
renewable only for one year. The labor reform allowed temporary contracts of several 
durations and without any authorization by the government. Workers under these contracts 
have the same benefits than workers with contracts of undetermined duration; however, if the 
employer fires a worker before the term of the contract, the firing cost of the permanent 
contract applies. These contracts can be of one year, with a maximum renovation of five 
years. The law also allowed temporary contracts for a specific work or service of a 
determined duration and with different frequencies.   27
These labor reforms made the labor markets more flexible, by eliminating absolute job 
stability, reducing firing costs, and allowing temporary contracts without any duration 
restriction. They also simplified payroll management by equalizing white and blue-collar 
workers. 
 
A2. Legal  non-wage  labor  costs 
 
On top of the basic workers receive wage several additional bonuses, which are subject to 
employers’ contributions and workers’ deductions. In this study, the additional wage is 
already included as part of the total wage. These additional concepts of wages add up to 
54.08% of the basic wage: 
 
Additional wages as a percentage of basic wages. June 2004 
 
Additional Concepts of Wages % of basic wage 
 
Compulsory Weekly Rest 
 
13.30 
Non-working holidays   3.33 
Family Assignments   2.70 
Two monthly wages   16.67 
Vacations   8.33 
Tenure bonus   9.72 
Total Additional Wage   54.08 
 
 
Additional wages include payments that should cover for weekends (DSO, Descanso 
semanal obligatorio), non-working holidays (FNL, Feriados no laborables), and bonuses 
that are related to the number of family members (family assignments). Besides, workers 
receive two extra monthly wages every year as Christmas and National Holiday bonuses 
called Gratificaciones. Vacations are paid holidays that last 30 days per year worked for the 
same employer. The tenure bonus (CTS, Compensación por Tiempo de Servicios) is an 
additional wage payment for every tenure year of the worker. 
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Employer’s contribution as a percentage of basic wages. June 2004 
 
Employer’s contributions % of wage 
 
Health Plan Payments  
 
9.00 
Solidarity Extraordinary Tax   1.70 
Manufacturing Training Fund   0.75 
Accident Insurance   3.00 
Total Employer’s Contributions   14.45 
 
 
Health Plan Payments represent 9% of the basic wage, of which 6.75% is for the public 
system (ESSALUD, Seguro Social de Salud) and 2.25% goes to the private system (EPS, 
Empresas Prestadoras de Salud), if the worker has a private health insurance. Otherwise, the 
whole contribution goes to the public system. 
The Solidarity Extraordinary Tax (IES, Impuesto Extraordinario de Solidaridad) was created 
in 1998 to replace mandatory contributions to finance housing, National Housing Fund 
(FONAVI, Fondo Nacional de Vivienda). Initiallly, it amounted to 2%of the basic wage., but 
then went down to 1.7%. 
Manufacturing Training contributions (SENATI, Servicio Nacional de Adiestramiento en 
Trabajo) only apply to some industrial firms (Category D of SIC). From 1994 onwards they 
have been going down from 1.5% to become, in 1997, 0.75% of the basic wage. Accident 
Insurance (SCTR, Seguro Complementario de Trabajo de Riesgo) is on average 3% of the 
basic wage. 
 
Workers’ deductions consist of income taxes and social security contributions and vary 
depending on the wage level and on whether the pension system is private or public: 
 
Workers’ deductions, Income Tax +Social Security, as a percentage of basic wages. June 
2004 
 









0-7 UIT  0.00  11.19 13.00 
7 -27 UIT  11.00  22.19 24.00 
27-54 UIT  16.00  27.19 29.00 
+54 UIT  +16.00  +27.19 +29.00 
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Employers retain income taxes and mandatory social security contributions from workers’ 
wages. For wage levels below 7 Tax Units (UIT, Unidad Impositiva Tributaria), there is no 
retention, Tax Units are monetary amounts fixed by the government, and updated from time 
to time. On June 2004, the UIT was S/. 3,200. From 7 UIT onwards employers have to make 
income tax deductions on workers’ payments: the lowest rate is 15% while the highest reach 
30%. The amount of social security contributions differs depending on the type of system. In 
the public pension system the contribution is 13%. In the private pension system the 
mandatory fixed contribution rate is 8%, the maintenance fee is on average 2.27%, and the 
insurance fee is on average 0.92%, totalling to 11.19%. 
 
A3. Wage  regressions 
 
In Table A1 we report the wage regressions, the first stage of our estimation of the labor 
demand elasticity. These are Mincer regressions done for white- and blue-collars, both for 
weekly and hourly wages, and for take-home wages using observed and legal workers 
deductions. Unfortunately, in the dataset we do not have workers’ education, which would 
make our regression a typical Mincer regression. However, we have age (which proxies 
potential experience) and tenure, as well as gender, union status, city of residence (Lima vs. 
other), and industrial sector. 
Both returns to age and to tenure are larger for white-collars than for blue-collars. However, 
while returns to age are larger than returns to tenure for white-collars, the opposite is true for 
blue-collars, returns to tenure are larger than returns to age. Among blue-collars gender wage 
differences are more pronounced than among white-collars. For blue-collars male workers 
earn around 20% more than their female counterparts. Among white-collars males earn 
around 7% more in weekly wages, but 3% more in hourly wage, than female workers. This 
difference may be due to the lower amount of hours worked by female white-collar workers. 
The effect of being unionized is to increase wages by around 25% for white-collars and by 
around 21% for blue-collars. Working in Lima, the capital of Peru, means a differential of 
more than 50% in white-collar wages and of 20% of blue-collar wages, over working in 
other cities.   30
Table A1: Wage regressions. Dummies for Industrial Sectors are used but not reported  
Standard errors in small fonts 
 
  White-collars Blue-collars 
  Wage Hourly  wage  Wage  Hourly  wage 
  Obs. Legal Obs. Legal  Obs.  Legal  Obs.  Legal 
Age 0.0775  0.0761  0.0805  0.791  0.0180  0.0178  0.0180  0.0178 
 0.0047  0.004  0.0047  0.0045  0.0045  0.0042  0.0044  0.0042 
Age
2 -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001 
 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
Tenure 0.0348  0.0348  0.0349  0.0349  0.0231  0.0226  0.0212 0.0208 
 0.0024  0.0023  0.0025  0.0024  0.0026  0.0024  0.0025  0.0024 
Tenure
2 -0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0007  -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
Male 0.0681  0.0663  0.0294  0.0276  0.2285  0.2216  0.2030  0.1960 
 0.0118  0.0115  0.0123  0.0120  0.0138  0.0134  0.0126  0.0122 
Union 0.2291  0.2246  0.2597  0.2552  0.1939  0.1910  0.2330  0.2301 
 0.0180  0.0175  0.0184  0.0180  0.0166  0.0160  0.0164  0.0158 
Lima   0.5300  0.5160  0.5683  0.5543  0.2226  0.2100  0.1966  0.1840 
 0.0114  0.0119  0.0119  0.0116  0.0132  0.0126  0.0126  0.0120 
Constant 3.5407 3.5485 -0.3719 -0.3640  4.3410  4.3331  0.6051  0.5972 
 0.0968  0.0914  0.0975  0.0925  0.0847  0.0806  0.0829  0.0787 
R
2  0.311 0.313 0.314 0.316  0.300  0.309  0.315  0.325 
 
 
A4. Computation  of  deadweight  losses 
 
The computation of the deadweight areas proceeds in the following way: 
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A5.  Deadweight losses of undercomplying with legal contributions 
 
For computing variations from observed to legal contributions, denoted respectively with the 
subscript ‘obs’ and ‘legal’ , wage levels w1 and w0 are then defined for 
 
1. employers’ contributions: w1 = w (1 + alegal) , w0 = w (1 + aobs) 
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1
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These wage levels are used both in the computation of deadweight losses as integrals and as 
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